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How far does the apple fall from the tree? The size of English bank branch 
networks in the nineteenth century 
 
After the Bank Charter Act in 1833, English banks could branch nationally without legal 
or geographical restriction. It has been previously thought that despite this freedom, early 
English joint-stock banks predominantly began as single units. Drawing upon a new 
dataset, this article maps the growth of branch banking, the size of bank networks and 
their geographical location and spread. It demonstrates that banks pursued branching 
strategies energetically against the intentions of regulators and were successful in forming 
large and complex networks. However, ultimately, before 1880 the majority settled for 
local, district and multi-regional structures, as opposed to national structures. 
 
Keywords: banks, branching, branches, regulation, strategy. 
 
Introduction 
 
Expanding out into new areas and territories is a strategy that is commonly used by 
businesses as a way to increase their revenues. The decision to enter into a new market 
is usually considered in an international or global context. As Jones has noted in his 
seminal study of the evolution of multinational firms, British banks were pioneers in 
expanding their businesses as they were undeterred by the difficulties and risks 
associated with crossing borders and managing branches that were far flung from the 
head office of the bank. Engaging energetically in the first wave of globalisation, British 
banks introduced banking to the colonies of Australia, Canada and the West Indies early 
in the nineteenth century.1 The overseas agenda of British banks has been characterised 
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in the business history literature as ambitious, entrepreneurial and flexible.2 However, 
the policy of domestic banks has the opposite reputation and for different reasons. At 
home, British banks have not been judged upon their own internal performance but 
upon their willingness to lend and support industrial growth.3 The British financial 
sector has been accused of failing to provide adequate amounts of capital to British 
industry in the nineteenth century as it saw these transactions as too risky.4 British 
banks have also been viewed as cautious with regard to their propensity to branch 
before the 1880s and the merger movement, again due to the inherent risk involved.5  
British banking has thus been seen as embodying conservative cultural values, resulting 
in a failure to fully seize opportunities to increase revenue.6 
This article breathes new life into an old debate about the character of the British 
banking. It focuses upon appetite for change and growth by examining the expansion of 
banks in the domestic rather than overseas market. We employ the concepts and 
frameworks that have been more commonly used in the literature on multinational 
banks to examine the entrepreneurial nature of British banks and their branching 
strategies.7  
As well as permitting entrepreneurial expansion, the ability to conduct branching 
is also considered to be a central factor which contributes to bank stability.8 Maintaining 
a network nationally or across regions allows banks to diversify their risk and increase 
profitability. Banks utilise their resources efficiently by moving money from areas 
where deposits are plentiful to other regions where demand for lending or opportunities 
for investments are greater. Yet branching is not without risk9: it may improve access to 
deposits and better liquidity but this can loosen control and even impair the bank’s 
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ability to gather local knowledge and soft information. Thus banks had to manage 
expansion via branching effectively in order to avoid undue risks and potential losses.   
Regulation has often been seen as the principal force that has prevented the 
establishment of large branch networks, in the United States in particular, as several 
states forbidding branching or establishing geographical limits on expansion.10 Britain 
in the nineteenth century, by contrast, was largely free from such restrictive legislation. 
Following the crisis of 1825/6, the Banking Co-partnership Act 1826 permitted the 
formation of joint-stock banks. After 1833, legal restrictions in England and Wales were 
lifted, removing limitations on the scope of geographical operation of banking and 
branching.  While there was no outright prohibition of branching, a series of reforms 
was passed thereafter which presented new obstacles in an indirect and subtle attempt to 
prevent and discourage such activities. From 1833 onwards, English banks could, in 
theory, legitimately follow any number of branching strategies and banks were 
permitted to operate across the nation. This research sheds light on the branching 
strategies that these banks decided to take, given that they operated with relative legal 
freedom to enter into such agreements but, at the same time, experienced political 
pressure to desist from ambitious planning and expansion. 
This article investigates the branching strategy of banks in England and Wales; 
their enthusiasm in creating large national networks capable of spreading risk 
geographically, as well as the dynamism and willingness to explore and service new 
areas. In doing so, it provides a unique insight into the ambition and strategy of the new 
joint stock banks and presents these institutions as able to take risks. These were not, as 
has previously been portrayed, timid or inherently conservative organisations. Given 
legislative freedom from 1826, the early joint stock banks looked to expand their 
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business and provide services for a growing customer base.  Such branching activity 
was not, as has previously been portrayed, the preserve of joint stock banks operating 
after 1880., 
Using a new dataset of branch networks, this article asks: did banks pursue 
flexible and ambitious branching strategies or did they act conservatively only forming 
small-scale single unit banks? What kind of networks – in terms of shape or size - did 
banks create? Did they create large branch networks of national proportions capable of 
diversifying risk geographically? The first section begins by providing an overview of 
the development of branch banking and traditional explanations for the levels of 
branching in the nineteenth century. The second then examines the dataset and discusses 
its key findings. The results from the dataset are analysed in terms of branch numbers 
and then we turn to the issue of locations and the size and shape of branch networks. 
Following this, the article then considers explanations for these trends; particularly the 
regulatory context for branch banking. Finally, we examine Manchester and Liverpool 
District Bank as a case study to further explore branch strategy. 
 
What was a branch and why were they important? 
The ability to branch is important to banks to enable them to expand their business and 
to reach new customers, both depositors and borrowers. Growth through branching is a 
quick and cost efficient way of gaining market share; business expansion; and 
diversifying deposit base, shareholder base and borrowing customer base.  
What is a branch? Under English regulation, branches have been defined loosely 
throughout history. This definition would constitute offices and places of establishment, 
so, therefore, include branches, sub-branches and agencies. In practice, the difference 
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between the three was quite considerable. A branch was overlooked by the head office. 
A sub-branch reported to the branch.11 An agent, not usually an employee or subject to 
those sanctions or level of control, would instead act with some independence and enter 
into contracts with third parties on the bank’s behalf.12 An office, on the other hand, 
comprised all three of these different types of businesses. It was simply a building in 
which the practice of banking took place. Other differences could include opening hours 
(for example only opening one day a week on market days) and premises, both of which 
could be quite considerable in terms of costs. Nevertheless, the type of business which 
took place at these locations, if not the volume, was largely the same. The diversity in 
the scale of branch operations persisted through the nineteenth century and into the 
early twentieth century.13
 
 
In the nineteenth century, branching was not only important for growth but also 
to spread the risks inherent in lending to local economies alone. By extending a bank’s 
spread geographically through branches, their customer base was also expanded, and 
thus the bank would be less dependent upon one area or region and the industry and 
commerce therein. Local banks, even with branches, tended to lend to one sector and 
such specialisation led to increased risk for the bank.14 Broader geographical expansion 
could reduce this risk. Branching also expanded a bank’s depositor base (the main 
source of funds above investment from shareholders), providing a more stable capital 
base. With this in mind, more deposits also provided lendable resources for the bank 
and thus increased the opportunity to profit from extending credit (with charges) to 
customers. Extra-regional branching thus provided a new opportunity for greater profits 
and the potential ability to absorb regional shocks.  
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Legislation had permitted the establishment of joint-stock banks in 1826 in order 
to encourage a more stable banking system. The ability to branch was available to all 
joint-stock banks from 1833 onwards, into the twentieth century, and added to the 
stability of many of these institutions. Yet during the nineteenth century, in an era 
where transport and communications were limited, there were also risks inherent in 
delegating authority to branch managers and in lending outside the sphere of knowledge 
of the bank’s head office and its directors. If a bank extended business too far and did 
not maintain control of advances made via branches distant from its head office, and to 
customers about which they had little direct knowledge, then poor lending decisions 
could be made and losses and instability could ensue. To reduce the risks involved in 
delegating authority to branches, it was essential that they were run efficiently and did 
not undertake lending that was excessively risky. Thus, bank head offices had to be able 
to control the activities of their branches through monitoring but also through delegating 
authority to their managers with confidence. This necessitated the appointment of both 
capable and trustworthy managers.  
Adam Smith was concerned with the risk taking that was potentially involved in 
the separation of ownership and control involved in joint-stock companies, whereby the 
principal (shareholders) delegated management authority to directors and managers 
(agents). He was concerned that those delegated to manage a company would never be 
as conscientious in their care of the money of others as they would of their own funds.15 
The banks formed after 1826 had joint-stock status but not limited liability (which was 
not permitted until 1858). Yet the ability to appoint and trust managers to run branches 
connected to the concerns of Smith. How could bank shareholders and directors be sure 
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that a manager appointed to run a company would do so in a reliable, trustworthy and 
successful manner?  
When considering industrial units in the twentieth century, Heim asserted that 
managing a network of distant branches ‘requires a degree of organizational 
sophistication’ and certain technology to enable processes to manage branches.16 
Insurance companies, such as the Prudential, successfully developed a national branch 
system to sell their policies.17 The ‘industrial’ branch system worked well as it was 
operated by agents who sold insurance policies directly to the consumer and 
consequently collected the premiums to pay for these policies. In this system there was 
an incentive for the agent to operate in an honest manner in order to ‘stay on good terms 
with their customers since they were an important source of repeat business and new 
leads’, in other words their incentive was to generate business and thus get paid.18 Thus, 
extensive branching in financial services operated successfully in insurance. Branching 
also took place in the retail sector in the nineteenth century from the 1850s onwards, 
with the trend for multiple shop retailing increasing from the 1870s, culminating in a 
few retailers possessing very large branch networks by 1914.19 Jefferys attributed this 
expansion in retail branching to being able to spot opportunities for expansion, the 
mastery of the organization of multiple units and the availability of capital. But he 
acknowledged that ‘expansion from a local or regional market to a national market 
proved more difficult’ due to capital requirements and the logistics involved in the 
national distribution of goods.20 Despite such problems, retailers had an incentive to 
branch due to the benefits that economies of scale could bring, in particular, lower 
operating costs and also the ability to purchase large volumes of goods at lower prices.21  
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The late nineteenth and early twentieth century has also been seen as the period 
for peak branching for banking in Britain. Yet, some early joint-stock banks ventured 
forward and branched, presumably making the assessment that any potential risk was 
worth the potential gain but these were previously considered to be rare.22 Noting that 
many banks began as single units, English bankers seemed to become fonder of 
branching as the nineteenth century progressed.23 A number of explanations have been 
proferred to explain why joint-stock bankers were reluctant branchers before 1880. 
First, these banks were thought to operate in a similar fashion to their private 
counterparts - expanding geographically and delegating authority to a variety of 
individuals was a level of risk that most private bankers were either unwilling or unable 
to take.24 In this system, information and knowledge, essential to bank stability and 
lending decisions, was exchanged and created by bankers who knew their customers 
and applicants. For example, Hudson observed in the 1830s and 1840s that ‘banks with 
branches in the West Riding ….. failed… partly it seems because remoteness from [the] 
head office meant that it was more difficult for branches correctly to assess the credit-
worthiness of parties applying for loans’.25 In the American case, Lamoreaux suggested 
that ‘specialization undoubtedly helped bankers reduce their vulnerability to failure’.26 
Branch banking can be seen as a risky strategy due to the problems associated with 
distance and communication. 
Second, while bankers possessed knowledge about their customers, it is also 
thought that they lacked the systems of control and those trained in accountancy to 
monitor a large branch networks. Sayers noted that shortly after Lloyds first became a 
joint-stock bank in 1865, no one ‘from the Managing Director down to junior clerks… 
had the slightest idea how to work the new ledgers… or how to start or carry on proper 
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entries’.27 Without basic information-recording procedures or staff to carry them out, 
Baker and Collins commented that coordination and ‘the concept of central control still 
remained something of a rarity!’28 Joint-stock banks could gain knowledge and 
experience by poaching more experienced staff from Ireland and Scotland29 where 
branching banking had taken place earlier and more extensively.30 For the most part, 
this problem was thought to be solved gradually as banks became well established and 
so could train and recruit their own staff from the lower ranks of their companies.31 It 
followed that with more opportunity to develop internal administrative processes and 
train their managerial staff, stronger mechanisms and standardised systems of control 
were instituted. In such an environment, banks could then engage in large-scale 
branching successfully. The transformation in accounting procedures and the 
professionalization of bank staff was tied to the development of branching habits and 
the change dated to the last quarter of the nineteenth century with the foundation the 
Institute for Bankers. The Institute was created in 1879 to produce better quality 
managers and to impose standards on the profession of banking.32  Thereafter, changes 
took place which saw a few large banks, with head offices based in London overlooking 
extensive branch networks.33 The ‘Big five’ banks that dominated the banking sector in 
1918 achieved their size by acquiring smaller banks through mergers and expanding 
their branch network. It was an efficient way of expanding geographically while at the 
same time reducing risk and uncertainty through gaining existing expertise and local 
knowledge.34 To summarise, previous literature has asserted that, while from 1833, 
joint-stock banks had no limits in their ability to branch in terms of regulation, before 
the 1880s they were hindered by what was thought to be a lack of experience in 
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branching and relatively poor training. The following section will consider the dataset 
and the number of banks and of their branches. 
 
Network size 
This section considers the number of banks and their branches, gathered from the 
dataset, before turning to locations of branches in the following section. The dataset 
shows several key developments in branch banking in this period; most notably the rise 
of banks with large branch networks and also the persistent but declining strength of 
single unit banks in England and Wales. Most significantly, this section provides 
evidence that joint-stock banks possessed extensive branch networks.  
The dataset used here has been constructed from a multitude of sources such as, 
Parliamentary Papers and Fenn’s Compendium, and after 1844, the Banking Almanac 
has been used. The Stamp Act 1815, required that banks send information which 
documented all the places and locations in which the bank and/or its branches existed to 
the Stamp and Tax Office. This information was published in two ways. First, those 
writing trade directories would gather this information from the Stamp and Taxes Office 
so that individuals would be able to identify locations to use banking services or transfer 
money. As such, directories would often detail the locations of all banks, both private 
and joint-stock. Second, in the absence of more stringent controls on disclosure of 
information, Parliament gathered and published this information on a near annual basis. 
This reflected its concern about the nature, scale and scope of joint-stock banking. 
Contemporaries questioned the accuracy of the branch data. Waterson, a 
compiler of statistical information, considered that ‘it is a common practice of the banks 
to insert in their licenses places where circumstances may induce them to establish 
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branches, but where none were in existence at the time the license was granted’.35 In 
other words, banks would say that they operated in a location that they did not as yet, in 
order to fend off competition. The result of this practice could mean that the number of 
branches would be far greater than those actually established.  
Without a rival dataset, it would perhaps be difficult to find evidence that 
falsification was widespread or the norm. Yet, more to the point, Joplin, a director in the 
National Provincial Bank of England and another joint-stock bank in Ireland, 
considered that ‘there can be no motive for making such a return, and I cannot imagine 
a single false return was ever intentionally made, though the mode of registration may 
no doubt be improved’.36 Thus, he saw nothing to be gained by falsifying returns. It is 
also important to remember that this information had a contemporary use and purpose: 
to establish the presence of banks and other financial institutions so that individuals 
could transfer money across the nation. A clear and predictable result of listing a false 
branch in a location that did not exist would be embarrassment, loss of custom and a 
certain degree of reputational damage.  
In order to combat the problem of inaccuracy, we have carried out a number of 
checks on the data and used anecdotal evidence from other sources to confirm their 
validity. Indeed, the sources used here caused some issues/problems. For instance, while 
all banks were required to submit this information, they did not follow a consistent way 
to list their offices. Basic problems and errors existed, such as inaccurate computation 
of the number of branches. One example involves the coding of place names. National 
Provincial Bank of England branched in ‘Newcastle Emlyn’ in west Wales but National 
Provincial Bank of England (or the Stamp Office) entered this location as two places 
and branches: ‘Newcastle’ and ‘Emlyn’. Following further investigation with local trade 
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directories, after finding out that ‘Emlyn’ did not exist, it transpired that National 
Provincial Bank of England did not branch in the city or town of ‘Newcastle’ (neither 
Newcastle upon Tyne in Northumberland or Newcastle under Lyme in Staffordshire) 
but actually it branched within ‘Newcastle Emlyn’. In other examples, banks gave the 
county name as well as the name of the city, town or village. While such an act could be 
perceived as deliberate attempt to exaggerate the extent of the firm’s coverage, a county 
name tended to be a useful way of giving the user clarity. A county name was generally 
used in the contexts where there the branch could be in a variety of locations because 
the city, town or village name was especially common. 
 
Table 1: The size of the branch networks 
 
  1830 1836 1844 1854 1864 1874 1877 
All banks               
Mean 5 8 6 6 8 10 12 
Median 1 3 2 2 3 4 5 
Standard 
Deviation 6 10 11 13 19 20 22 
Maximum 25 42 93 99 162 149 153 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Number 16 63 105 98 109 120 119 
                
Five Largest 
banks               
Mean 12 34 41 49 75 86 94 
Median 10 40 27 26 33 50 72 
Standard 
Deviation 7 9 26 32 56 47 44 
Maximum 25 23 93 99 162 149 153 
Minimum 4 42 23 20 27 46 52 
 
Source: Dataset 
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Figure 1: The number of bank offices in England and Wales, 1827-1877 
 
Source: Dataset 
 
Having addressed the construction of the dataset, Table 1 demonstrates that the key rise 
in branches was in 1836 and from the 1860s onwards. It shows that whilst the mean 
number of offices per bank rose from 5 in 1830 to only 12 in 1877, the five largest 
banks in the sample show that the more vigorous branch banks expanded their 
networks. They did so in a linear fashion and far more prodigiously than the ‘norm’, 
reaching an average of 94 branches by 1877. Figure 1 organises the number of branches 
that they possessed (from unit banks to those with 2, 3 or 4 branches, 5 to 9 branches or 
with 10 or more branches) in order to contrast banks with branch networks to those with 
a few branches and those single unit banks. While National Provincial’s branch network 
has been traditionally recognised as being atypically large,37 this dataset shows that 
numerous other banks also managed a complex network of branches, if not on quite the 
same scale as the National Provincial, contradicting previous assertions that the early 
joint stock banks were reluctant branchers. 
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Figure 1 shows that English and Welsh joint-stock banks branched vigorously. 
Although the majority of joint-stock banks in operation between 1826 and 1877 were 
single unit banks, a significant proportion had relatively large branch networks - that is 
from 10 to 162 branches. In particular, those branching in and before 1836, when joint-
stock banking was in its infancy, had traditionally been viewed as being predominantly 
small, unit banks yet the dataset demonstrates otherwise. For example, Stuckey’s Bank, 
formed after the passage of the 1826 Act as a merger of private banks, possessed 9 
offices in 1827. The Wilts and Dorset Bank and West of England and South Wales 
District Bank began trading in 1836 with branches in 42 and 20 locations respectively.38 
Regional branch banking was not confined to the South West of England as the North 
and South Wales Bank (established in 1836) almost doubled the size of its branch 
network in its first year of operation with a rise from 22 to 41 offices.39 Such expansion 
was not always anticipated. For instance, the Plymouth and Devonport Banking 
Company renamed itself the Devon and Cornwall Banking Company in 1833 ‘in 
consequence of its having extended its branches beyond the limits originally 
contemplated’.40 Overall, Figure 1 identifies that in 1836 the number of banks with 
large branch networks (those in the category of 10 or more branches) almost equalled 
single-units banks. 
After 1836 branch networks generally regressed towards the smaller or single 
unit model. Following the failure of the Northern and Central Bank in 1836, Parliament 
inquired as to the circumstances of its collapse and several witnesses blamed its failure 
on large branch networks and the quality of the management of both the bank and its 
branches.41 This had an important set of consequences. Several banks, including the 
Ashton, Stalybridge, Hyde and Glossop Bank, abandoned their plans to branch.42 Some, 
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for example the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank, were able to buck the trend 
and maintained a network of 23 offices. Contraction, coupled with an increase in 
number of newly formed single-unit banks, meant that the average number of offices 
per bank fell to more modest levels (see Table 1 and Figure 1). In 1836, joint-stock 
banks had an average of almost 8 offices per bank, demonstrating that branching in the 
early phase of their development was marked. With gradual expansion thereafter, as 
Table 1 shows, the average branch network in England and Wales was not this size 
again until the mid-1860s.  
Therefore, some banks in our sample undertook ambitious branching strategies 
before 1836. After a hiatus in branching activity from 1836-1857, several banks – those 
with the largest branch networks in our sample - undertook aggressive branching 
strategies in the early 1860s, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. This branching was at a 
regional level but the example of the National Provincial Bank of England attests to the 
ability of an English bank to run a large, multi-regional branch network successfully 
during this period. 
National Provincial, originally established in 1833, started out and remained an 
ambitious brancher. It was the bank with the greatest number of branches in 1844. By 
1877, National Provincial was ‘out branched’ (in terms of numbers of branches) only by 
the London and County Banking Company, established in 1836. Between 1854 and 
1877, the London and County Banking Company had begun a policy of rapid 
expansion, almost doubling the size of its network from 57 branches to 153. National 
Provincial likewise enlarged its network but by 1877 it was marginally smaller with 143 
branches. The remaining large branch banks also followed a strategy of geographical 
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expansion but their branch networks remained smaller than either National Provincial 
and London and County Banking Company. 
Thus the dataset shows that there were several banks with substantial networks 
throughout this period. Although the majority of the first wave of joint-stock banks in 
England and Wales constituted single unit banks, a significant number also engaged in 
branching and a significant number formed complex and extensive branch networks. 
The next major upheaval in the structure of banking in the UK occurred in the 
amalgamation movement of the 1880s and 1890s. This evidence contradicts the view 
that joint-stock banks were reluctant branchers prior to the merger movement of the 
1880s and 1890s, as has previously been asserted. 
  
Network shape 
Thus from the very outset, joint-stock banks conducted extensive branch operations. As 
they became more established, and had a propensity to branch more than their private 
counterparts, their networks spread to extend to areas not well served by private banks. 
Gilbart, the manager of London & Westminster joint-stock bank, explained that a joint-
stock ‘branch bank may thus be established in a place where a private bank could not 
exist’.43 In such cases, it would be affordable and profitable to establish a branch but not 
a whole bank. Despite the advantages of branch banking, this section finds that all 
banks tended to follow a regional rather than a truly national branch strategy.  
Branching locally was an intrinsic part of the joint-stock format and its ability to 
gain more custom through this strategy ensured that a joint-stock bank could survive 
competition with their private counterparts. Indeed, branching to improve local levels of 
community service was a key part of the strategy of the first wave of joint-stock 
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bankers’ strategy, and they aimed to service nearby communities efficiently with 
banking provision, especially after the financial losses experienced in the 1825/6 crisis. 
For example, the Huddersfield Bank prospectus, declared that private bank failures:  
‘have been the means of again retarding the growing prosperity of a district 
which in former years had to encounter similar evils. By the failure of these 
banks a vacuum has been caused which, in all probability, will be filled up 
by other establishments of a similar nature; equally subject to the same 
disasters and from which the same consequences may again arise; unless a 
public company of a more solid description be formed in their place’. 44 
Indeed, the data in Figure 2 shows that banks with large branch networks displayed a 
distinctly regional focus and rarely served multiple commercial centres. For instance, 
Manchester and Liverpool District Bank rather unsurprising located itself in the north 
west. It opened a branch as far as Bangor in the 1830s but soon abandoned it. London 
and County, the bank with the highest number of branches at the end of our dataset in 
1877, did not expand that far outside of the south east. While failure to branch at a 
distance may be seen as a sign of lack of ambition and indeed conservatism, there was a 
fine line between ambition and naivety.  
If strong systems of governance or control of branches were not enacted, the 
bank could be exposed to risk or poor performance. Poor procedures and processes for 
information recording could be developed over time and these were learned 
competencies. Through experimentation and experience, supervision could be 
improved, but the immediate risk could be fatal. There were also heightened hazards 
involved in lending to industries that were outside the immediate area of expertise of 
bank directors and managers. Such dangers would usually be reduced at a local level 
  
19 
through knowledge about customers and the sectors in which they operated gathered 
through local networks or via personal relationships with customers. Branching outside 
a local hinterland obscured such local advantages. Over-extension and excessive 
branching could also, potentially, lead to less responsible banking and of course costs 
would be incurred, for example costs to the bank of communicating with and 
monitoring branches.  
The National Provincial Bank of England came closest to a national coverage by 
1877 but, as Figure 2 shows, its geographical spread was patchy and incomplete; it 
performed as a multi-regional bank rather than a truly national bank. It expanded 
aggressively over time and developed a wide network. It noticeably did not branch 
extensively in either the north west or in Yorkshire, but it branched more extensively in 
areas where joint-stock banking services were less prominent, such as the south west of 
England and in Wales. Moreover, its branching in London did not take place in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, but rather 1857. It was, as its name suggests, a provincial 
bank.45 Therefore it operated in many ways like a series of connected district or regional 
banks. Even so, National Provincial illustrates that the problems of weak control and 
distance could be overcome. 
With the introduction of limited liability in 1857, banks changed their strategy 
and the impact of the legislation on branching was two fold. First, it provided 
opportunity for a new wave of bank promotions and these formed with a distinct and 
different shaped network, as shown in Figure 3. In the 1860s, the country was becoming 
a crowded market for banks and they serviced all major cities and commercial areas.46 
Yet, with a prosperous economy, bankers took advantage of the strategy of expansion 
into two or more cities, demonstrating the competitive environment for banking but also 
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the space for competition in the market. 47 New banks, instead of prolific branching at a 
regional or district level, had a smaller number of branches but a set of complex 
geographical profiles. These banks expanded the most in terms of distance from their 
head office but their network was leaner and more focussed than previous branching 
strategy. The post-limited liability banks centred upon hubs of industry and targeted 
cities with high levels of commercial activity rather than entire regions. Many new 
entrants founded after limited liability were governed by a London head office with a 
multi-regional branch network, for example London and Provincial (formerly known as 
Provincial Banking Company),48 London and South Western, London and Northern and 
London Bank of Scotland.49 Looking out from London, these banks possessed a 
‘London plus’ network. This activity existed in sharp contrast to those joint-stock banks 
that established in London in the 1830s and 1840s. The latter banks did not initially 
create wide branch networks that spanned to distant and major hubs. Yet, such activity 
had occurred by the end of the dataset in 1877, with the new ‘London plus’ strategy 
adopted after the introduction of limited liability.  
A second feature of bank strategy after 1857 was the renewed expansion of the 
existing banks as a response to the threat of new competition. These new banks tended 
to compete and overlap several territories held by existing joint-stock competitors. In 
1885, Rae explained the strategy of the banks formed before limited liability and the 
motivations behind reactive expansion:  
If on the line of towns A., B., and C. you have Branches at A. and C. only, 
you could not allow another bank to occupy B. You would have to do so 
yourselves, although you might have to work the Branch at a loss’. 50 
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Existing banks thus expanded and used branches as a shield to protect territorial 
advantage and to prohibit the establishment of new banks.51 This expansion was 
therefore local and banks did not expand extra-regionally or at a distance.  
The refusal to adopt a national system had prompted Gilbart to comment in 
1836, that the English branching system was a ‘district’ system and ‘analogous’ to the 
one in the United States. He considered that ‘American banks do not extend their 
branches into neighbouring states’.52 The post-limited liability London-plus banks had 
expanded outward. Yet they still did not take the opportunity to operate on a national 
level. Neither did the first wave of banks formed before 1857, which were regional or 
district entities. Indeed, not much appeared to have changed in terms of their network 
shape.  
Overall, even though English regulation permitted banks to establish national 
banking structures, the networks with the largest number of branches tended, like 
American banks, to be concentrated or locked within regions. These district banks 
formed in the first phase of joint-stock banking (1826-1857). Some banks, especially 
those formed after limited liability, maintained London-plus networks. With smaller but 
more focussed multi-city networks, the post limited liability banks sought to cover 
several hubs of commercial activity. National Provincial Bank of England came closest 
to forming a national network but even so, it failed to achieve consistent or truly 
national coverage. Instead, it appeared as a multi-regional bank. Having examined in 
details patterns of bank branching, the next section considers the regulatory context in 
which this branch activity took place. 
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Figure 2: The distribution of all branch locations for National Provincial, London and 
County and Manchester and Liverpool District Bank  
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Figure 3: The distribution of all branch locations for London and Provincial Bank 
Limited, London and South Western Limited and London and Yorkshire Bank Limited. 
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Regulatory context 
Across the nineteenth century, reforms aimed explicitly to contract the size of the banks 
or their branch networks in England and Wales. The branching that took place was thus 
in spite of these regulatory concerns. Moreover, several of the peaks and troughs in the 
numbers of branches can be explained by the changing nature and influence of 
regulation, together with the growing political and social dislike for branch banking. 
This section examines legislation that permitted (or restricted) the development of joint-
stock banking companies as new financial institutions and permitted an entirely 
different model of banking – one that developed a branch network - in comparison to 
their private counterparts.  
Before 1826, the Bank of England held a monopoly on the practice of joint-
stock banking and prevented more than six partners from creating a bank. Following the 
crisis in 1825/6, emergency legislation intervened to improve the stability of the English 
banking system. The Banking Co-partnership Act 1826 altered the Bank of England’s 
monopoly in order to remove the six-partner restriction and thus introduce joint-stock 
banks. It encouraged new banks to operate like partnerships and private banks that did 
not branch. These new banks would have an unlimited number of owners, in 
comparison to the private banks which were limited to just six partners. Joint-stock 
banks were permitted to form outside of a 65-mile radius of London.53 The Bank of 
England defended its exclusion zone vigorously through litigation, but more often mere 
legal threats were sufficient to see off those trying to establish within the 65-mile 
exclusion zone.54  
In terms of branching, the wave of new banking legislation did not alter the 
regulation of the size of branch networks. Indeed, the Stamp Act 1815 remained in 
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place. It required that banks had to apply for a licence for every branch, which cost £30 
each, but an out-dated clause stated the maximum number of licences required was four. 
In practice, this meant that a bank with 50 branches needed only four licences.55 As 
Parliamentary inquiries clarified that the law did not limit the number of branches in 
1833, and again in 1836, so joint-stock banks followed the letter of the law.56 They did 
not apply for more than four licences, even if the bank had more than four branches. In 
contrast, private banks (that did not branch and the basis upon which the legislation was 
founded) rarely tested or pushed through this threshold whereas joint-stock banks did.57 
The Bank Charter Act of 1833 reaffirmed the Bank of England’s monopoly and, 
by extension, the rights of other bankers. The Act of 1833 confirmed that joint-stock 
banks were now permitted to establish in London, within the 65-mile exclusion zone, 
but that they would not have note-issuing rights.58 Joint-stock bankers had pushed the 
legal boundaries to ensure that they could establish a branch network of national 
proportions, one that extended across the whole of England and Wales, including 
London, without geographical restriction. As this rule already existed in common law, 
the Bank of England and Parliament felt obliged to keep it and maintain the legal 
position. 
Parliamentary inquiries in 1836, 1837, 1838 reflected a residual nervousness 
about branch banking, an anxiety which had developed in the 1820s when joint-stock 
banks began branching (unexpectedly in the eyes of the legislators – see below), and 
which led to a strong push in Parliament for new legislation to curb branching activity, 
and to restrict joint-stock banks more generally. Anxiety was expressed in relation to 
unnecessary branches and potential resultant instability. 59 After a period of intense 
political scrutiny in the 1820s and 1830s, and following the high profile failure of 
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Northern and Central Bank in particular in 1836 - a bank with a large branch network - 
Parliament finally achieved their aim with legislation in 1844.60  
The 1844 Bank Charter Act was a reaction to the unforeseen action by those 
joint-stock banks established after the 1826 Bank Act. These banks could be formed 
with relatively minimal effort and, as the cost of licences to establish branches were 
nominal, early banking legislation did very little to dis-incentivise branch expansion. As 
branch banking was not inherently connected to the existing model of private banking, 
legislators did not understand the risks associated with it nor did they predict the 
changes that were to come. With the Scottish model in mind, bankers in England 
exploited this misunderstanding and branched. The attitude towards branching in 
parliament changed with the failure of Northern and Central in 1836, and the law 
restricting joint-stock bank formation followed in 1844.  
The 1844 legislation acted to curb further growth in banking in two ways. Firstly 
it did so in order to prevent the promotion of new banks. Peel, the bill’s promoter, 
ensured that any new joint-stock bank could only be established by letters of patent or 
by royal charter and a large amount of capital. The 1844 Act thus discouraged new bank 
formation and promoted a return to charter based incorporations with new restrictive 
capital requirements. New joint-stock banks were required to have a minimal capital of 
£100,000 and share denomination of £100.  
Secondly, the new legislation discouraged the development and maintenance of 
large branch networks. Peel doubted ‘whether these banks having 50 or 60 branches in 
very small towns renting houses and appointing efficient persons to superintend them is 
a wise policy’.61 With this in mind, the 1844 Acts acted to inhibit mergers and 
amalgamations (often a way to form branch networks) by restricting the use of financial 
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instruments. The Act achieved this by limiting each bank’s note issue to the amount in 
circulation in 1844, a measure also used to hinder movement within the banking system. 
The new rules would mean that only the Bank of England could increase its own note 
issuing. Thus if a private bank joined with another bank to form a joint-stock bank after 
1844, it could not combine note issue. Similarly, joint-stock banks could not merge and 
retain both issues. As joint-stock banks and private banks tended to be banks of issue, it 
was intended to deter amalgamations between banks. And if a bank was a new 
promotion it could not issue notes at all, adding to the disincentive to new formations.  
The Act also closed the legal loophole that required banks to only purchase four 
licences costing £30 each (irrespective of the size of the network). Under the 1844 Act, 
banks had to have a licence for every single branch in their network. Although the cost 
of the licence had not changed and remained at £30, the new requirement to take out a 
licence for every branch would deter the retention of old branches which were 
unprofitable, but also discourage the opening of new branches.  
The policy of 1844 aimed explicitly to restrict further growth of joint-stock 
banking and to reduce the size of a large branch networks. Indeed, it was successful in 
the former but not the latter. It halted new promotions as only 12 new joint-stock banks 
were formed between 1844 and 1857 (when the legislation was repealed),62 and banks 
did not restart or conduct a strategy of expansion. However, during this period, banks 
did not follow Peel’s instructions and downsize their networks. Some banks had already 
reduced the size of their networks in 1836 but there was no further decline in the size of 
the branch network under the 1844 legislation.  
The introduction of general corporate limited liability in 1855 was seen by some 
legislators as a means to improve management of firms rather than encourage growth or 
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risk taking.63 For banks, limited liability was introduced later, in 1857 with the repeal of 
the 1844 Act. The repeal also enabled joint-stock bank promotion to re-start.  
Dissatisfaction with the 1844 Act had been growing. It was fuelled by continued 
failures within the few banks founded under its provisions and what were increasingly 
seen as overly restrictive measures pertaining to both note issuing and bank formation.  
In particular, the financial crisis of 1847 required the government to authorise the Bank 
of England to disregard the restriction of note issuing under the 1844 Act in order to 
reassure the business community. A financial crisis imported from America in late 1857 
required similar action.64  Remaining instability in the banking system and the 
requirement of more liberal note issuing during crises thus persuaded the government to 
repeal the 1844 Bank Act and to introduce limited liability to banking.    
The Companies Acts passed between 1857 and 1862 led to banks being able to 
register as limited liability companies. As such, the liability of bank directors and 
shareholders became limited to the size of their investment/share in the bank.65 These 
banks could be formed merely by registration and this sparked a promotion boom. 
Importantly the Companies Act of 1857 retained some of the restrictive clauses and 
capital requirements from the 1844 Act.66  
Responding to the new regulation, growth in banking services in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century owed much to a bulk of new promotions from the 1860s 
onwards, as well as the expansion of existing companies. Many banks and their branch 
networks had already been established by 1844 and remained relatively unchanged. 
Others expanded again, albeit without the buoyancy and excitement of their initial 
branching activity. Joint-stock banking was no longer new in England and Wales, as in 
1826, and both the banks and their customers had more confidence in institutions owned 
  
29 
by numerous shareholders and with the capacity to branch. The story into the second 
half of the nineteenth century can be seen as one of continued but more gradual change. 
Thus, despite opposition and the 1844 legislation that restricted new joint-stock bank 
formations, the rise of joint-stock banks with branches began again from the 1860s.  
If legislators disliked large branch networks so much, why not just prohibit 
them? A simple explanation exists and this point is entirely counterfactual. English law 
had never restricted the size or scope of branch networks. To make such a large change 
in the substance of regulation needed to be supported by a compelling argument. Even if 
this could be found, implementing such legislation and would have been difficult to say 
the least. By 1844, large branch networks had formed. Undoubtedly, these were 
unwanted by some. Yet, in order to remove them, parliament would need to pass 
retrospective legislation. Retrospective legislation was notoriously difficult to achieve 
as it was from a constitutional context thought to be inherently unjust. Individuals could 
not travel back in time to make different choices. However, in a banking context, 
proposals for retrospective legislation were not uncommon. It had made certain 
transactions, which might have been illegal, clearly legal.67 Passing legislation, which 
made past conduct illegal, would be an entirely different matter. Policy-makers were, 
therefore, left with an ambition to influence future, not past, conduct and to operate 
within the confines of the current regulatory system. In short, they could use the 
traditional mechanisms to control behaviour, such as imposing barriers to promoting 
new firms, denying corporate status, and providing disincentives through altering the 
cost of licences. 
Although the legislation here was complex and ever changing, one point did not 
change in this period: legislators thought that banks were supposed to be small in scale 
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and also in terms of geographical spread. The first legislators did not anticipate the size 
of joint-stock banking and its propensity to develop branches. Bankers succeeded in 
pushing through legislation which allowed them to form a national network and took the 
opportunity to do so. Following the failure of some ambitious branchers (the Northern 
and Central Bank in 1836 and the Yorkshire District Bank in 1840), legislation was 
passed in 1844 which aimed to restrict the pace at which these banks expanded. But the 
Bank Charter Act 1844 was enacted after distinct changes had taken place. In particular 
many banks by this point had taken the opportunity to establish branch networks. It 
therefore could not remove them in their entirety. After the Act’s repeal in 1857, 
expansion could (and did) begin again with few barriers to entry. 
Having examined the regulatory environment surrounding joint-stock banks, the 
next section goes on to examine a case study of a bank that branched in order to shed 
light on the branching strategy of banks in this period. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Regional banking strategy 
The following section uses Manchester and Liverpool District Bank as an example in 
order to explore the reasons behind the shape of its network. This case study will 
provide more detail with regard to the branching activity of a typical regional/district 
bank. By using this case study, this section will discuss the bank’s strategy; its 
motivations behind a regional strategy; and some factors which prevented extra-regional 
expansion. In doing so, it will examine the advantages and disadvantages of having a 
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branch network and offer some conclusions as to why it branched and did not remain a 
single unit, yet why it did not extend to a national scale. 
Manchester and Liverpool District Bank was founded in 1829 and had a network 
of branches throughout the period that was large and sizeable. The bank began as the 
‘District Union Bank’ without stipulating a clear or specific geographical remit in its 
name. So from its very conception, the bank was intended to serve a broad geographical 
area but it was always focussed upon the cities of Manchester and Liverpool and the 
surrounding region.68 It was therefore a district and not a national bank, as reflected in 
both its original and revised name. With a head office in Manchester, after foundation it 
earmarked fourteen other smaller locations to branch in and expanded into these areas 
and beyond with quick succession (all eventual branch locations plotted on Figure 2).  
Why open branches and not form as a single unit? Branches have sometimes 
been viewed as part of a “single unit plus” strategy. In this sense, branches supported 
the main hub of the business and acted as a form of advertising for the core of the 
business; another means to attract new customers at the centre.69 Although the branches 
in the network may not have been even in size or profitability, they would act as a 
supportive structure for its central location and act to enlarge the business flowing 
through the main branch or head office. 
The principal reason why the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank created 
and maintained a large network was to seek out new deposit taking, note issuing and 
lending in new places outside a central or key location. Table 3 shows that a large 
proportion of account holders were found in the area outside the head office in 
Manchester. Thus branching allowed the bank to access new sources of capital and 
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finance outside this city. With this strategy in place, capital would then flow from one 
place to another, and if necessary back to the centre.  
Branches found customers in towns and villages, essentially in locations where 
the population was small but, importantly, sufficiently wealthy. Table 3 shows that 
Stockport held an unusually high number of depositors yet in terms of net average 
contribution this was not an especially prosperous area. Those in Bury, by comparison, 
deposited on average £703 - more than those in the prosperous areas of Manchester and 
Liverpool. Gilbart, the manager of London and Westminster joint-stock bank, explained 
the key motivation for branch locations. It would ‘be opened in places not sufficiently 
wealthy to furnish capital for a joint-stock bank, and where the people have no banking 
facilities’.70 Thus a branch could be established in a location where it was not 
financially viable to establish a full bank. Manchester and Liverpool, as large 
commercial centres, were not short of wealthy people but the areas outside these cities 
held customers that would also be desirable to the bank.71  
As the bank began its formation in 1829, without intense competition, it had a 
first mover advantage in terms of filling physical space.72 Threats to open a new rival 
bank in Bury in 1832 forced the bank to think immediately about opening a branch 
there. Within two months, this process was complete.73 As opening a branch could be 
quick and relatively cheap, in comparison to promoting a whole new bank, the 
Manchester and Liverpool District Bank was able to fend off competition and rival 
single units. Indeed, as Table 3 suggests, the local economy held considerable wealth 
and offered opportunities for sustainable growth. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
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In this process of rapid expansion, poor local knowledge could prevent further 
expansion and maintenance of the network. Yet this should be separated clearly from 
issues of education, training and literacy. Thomas Kinnersley acted as the manager for 
the Newcastle-under-Lyme branch but after his death in 1855, the bank simply gave up 
with the branch. The Board considered that if it had not been for “Mr Kinnersely’s 
death it [the branch] would have succeeded”.74 Thomas Kinnersley was theoretically 
replaceable. Indeed, with around thirty other branches, the bank had staff with equal 
levels of training and education. Kinnersley’s uniqueness lay in the fact that he had been 
a private banker before conversion of his bank to a branch of the Manchester and 
Liverpool District Bank, and subsequently his appointment as branch manager. He 
therefore possessed knowledge of his local community and the creditworthiness of 
customers that would be advantageous to the bank.  For the bank, closing Kinnersley’s 
old branch did not mean a loss of custom as several moved to existing branches close by 
in Hanley. 
Taking over or merging with existing private banks overcame the problems 
which inhibited expansion, namely lack of local knowledge and banking expertise. As 
the Kinnersley example demonstrates, it was a way to achieve geographical size with 
relatively few risks. As private banks had already built a customer base and reputation, 
merger was a simple way to strengthen the acquirer’s commercial position and therefore 
create a large and sizeable geographical spread. Yet, unless the branch could prove to be 
successful, it would be closed. 
Although the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank engaged in mergers with 
smaller banks in the region, it did not spread itself across the nation. But it did enter 
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neighbouring counties. Branches formed in towns and villages not geographically very 
distant but over the county boundary of Lancashire (where Manchester and Liverpool 
were located), such as Stone and Newcastle-under-Lyme in Staffordshire in the West 
Midlands. It did, however, avoid moving further afield to major commercial areas and 
cities such as Birmingham, as shown in Figure 2.   
Additional branches tended to be formed in the main through a cautious policy 
of sub-branching. A sub-branch existed as an attachment to a branch rather than an 
independent branch in its entirety. 75 So for the sub-branch, the branch staff would visit 
for a few hours or days in the week. In some instances, this rather careful policy proved 
successful and some sub-branches were converted into full and separate branches.76 
This was a good way of trying out a location before committing more fully to 
establishing a branch there. This strategy imitated that of the National Provincial Bank 
of England as it sought to explore and essentially overbank its existing regions and 
largely ignore the others with which the bank remained unfamiliar. Prudence ultimately 
meant that the bank did not achieve a wide geographical spread. 
As a result of the principal focus on Manchester and Liverpool and the 
neighbouring region, the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank was susceptible to 
regional shocks. The reliance on a single regional economy caused several problems. 
The North West and Lancashire region were both highly dependent on the cotton 
industry.77 When in 1865, the bank’s Managing Director calculated a high number of 
bad debts he ‘had the satisfaction of feeling that none of them [could be] attributed to 
their negligence of want or judgment’. He explained that they were ‘mainly the 
necessary and unavoidable consequence of the accumulated losses which have arisen 
from the deficiency of cotton’. 78  With a cautious local branching strategy, the Board 
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accepted that problems in the local economy created instability in its own business. 
Although the bank was careful not to be over reliant on a single customer, a high 
proportion of the population it serviced found employment or owned businesses in 
cotton and its related industries during this period.79 Such regional industrial 
specialisation was bound to have an impact on the banks that serviced the community.  
How could a bank be strengthened against such shocks in local and regional 
economies? It remains overwhelming clear from the Board minutes that the bank, at this 
stage in its history, did not engage in a serious discussion about merging with another 
large regional or district bank to create a multi-regional or even national bank.80 It did 
not, like other banks, exchange information or business with banks in other regions.81 
The Manchester and Liverpool District Bank instead sought to expand on a smaller 
scale through existing channels - at the peripheries - but only if its management felt that 
the move would be successful and likely to be met with an influx of new custom. Long-
distance branching seemed to be unthought-of and it settled for a regional profile in an 
area with ample opportunity for profit and expansion. 
 
Conclusions 
Geographical expansion through branching has been viewed as most significant in UK 
banking during the merger movement from the 1880s to the 1890s, when the average 
network exceeded 100 branches per bank, and when private banking was almost 
completely eclipsed.82 Yet this dataset has shown that there was much more branching 
in the period prior to the amalgamation movement, especially before 1836, than has 
previously been acknowledged. Lack of banking education and banking skills did little 
to halt the pace of expansion. Moreover, the data analysed here shows that the process 
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of branching was much more nuanced, fractured and non-linear than has previously 
been thought. Banks expanded branch networks but also sometimes retracted them.  
This expansion was, in some cases, on a large-scale and despite the best efforts 
of regulators to curb their enthusiasm for expansion and instead foster the operation 
small banks with limited branching activity. To be clear, legal rules did not prohibit the 
growth of formulation of a national or large network. However, legal rules are best 
understood in the context in which they were created. Policy makers, politicians and 
lawyers act together to ascribe a meaning or value to the words used to create legal 
rules. Contemporaries who followed the debate and their language would nevertheless 
have understood sentiments and intention, which may not be plain and clear in the letter 
of law. Indeed, bankers did follow this debate and legal changes with interest. Although 
not prohibited by law, banking policy sought to reduce the size of branch networks at 
many points throughout the nineteenth century. 
After gaining the legal ability to create a network in the provinces from 1826 
and nationally from 1833, banks pursued energetic, vigorous and aggressive branching 
strategies but this initial enthusiasm was short-lived. Regulation and negative political 
pressure from legislators curbed ambition after 1836. But it was not the end of branch 
banking. By 1836, branch networks had proved to be sizeable and growing. Indeed, in 
some cases, they had branched and expanded well beyond the bank’s original intentions 
and place of birth. Yet, following the failure of the Northern and Central Bank in 1836, 
and the political aftermath, this changed: networks contracted and branching strategies 
became less evolutionary. Several banks formed before 1844 did not regain this 
enthusiasm for mass or aggressive extra-regional expansion.  
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For many formed before 1844, such as the Manchester and Liverpool District 
Bank, expansion thereafter took place at a piecemeal rate throughout existing regions or 
by discreetly and cautiously entering into new areas. Ambitious geographical expansion 
and the formation of a truly national bank were no longer on the agenda. Even National 
Provincial Bank of England, established in 1833, which in its name purported to 
become both a national and provincial bank, was only a provincial bank with a wide 
network of branches across many regions but not with what could be called a truly 
national coverage. For those banks formed before 1844, while the networks were large, 
gaps in the regional market were still visible and provided ample opportunity for new 
business. National Provincial’s network, for example, displayed large gaps in the North 
West and Yorkshire. Moreover, if there were still profitable gaps left to fill on the 
banking map at a regional level, there was not the spur to form a national bank with the 
potential risks that this entailed. Thus, a bank with nationwide branch coverage did not 
develop before 1857. 
By the second half of the century, competition gained intensity and it was up to 
the new banks formed under limited liability legislation of 1857 to break this provincial 
focus and begin a multi-regional programme of expansion. Under this new strategy, 
banks pushed out from London and gained new territory through branching. It was the 
new banks that looked outwards from London and which threatened and sparked a 
competitive drive from the pre-existing banks. Thus there was a movement towards a 
national agenda that was ultimately fulfilled at the start of the twentieth century. Indeed, 
once many of the gaps in the market for banking had been filled following bank 
expansion after 1857, the spur for greater market control came from these ambitious 
banks that gained a geographical advantage through multi-regional branching. 
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Therefore, it was increasing competition and pressure for market share, as the banking 
map of England and Wales became increasingly ‘filled’, that resulted in joint-stock 
banks national branch networks by 1900. 
The rhythmic nature of branch banking expansion can in many ways be 
attributed to changes in English law. The Acts passed in 1844 put a break on expansion. 
Nevertheless, joint-stock banks pushed back against such negative legal sentiment and 
still engaged in branch banking. Banks had, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, established relatively large and complex branch networks which would 
constitute the core basis of their business for the remainder of the century. It provided 
the experience of managing banking business through branches that later led to the 
successful establishment and operation of national branch networks by London based 
banks in the late-nineteenth century. Most notably, after serious political pressure 
against branch banking, they did not bow to legal rules or intent and return to the single 
unit model. Some banks remained as single units up to 1877, but these were very few in 
numbers. While banks either did not have or gave up a national ambition by finding 
plenty of opportunity for profit locally, our findings show that English and Welsh banks 
engaged entrepreneurially in branching and established large networks well before the 
merger movement of the 1880s despite the apparent risks.  
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